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SHOULD COERCIVE INTERROGATION BE LEGAL? 
 
Eric A. Posner* 
Adrian Vermeule** 
 
 
Coercive interrogation is now a live subject, thanks to 9/11. At one time, coercive 
interrogation played a role only in philosophical disputes about consequentialism, in 
which scholars asserted or denied that the police could interrogate an individual in order 
to extract the location of a ticking nuclear bomb. None of the participants in those debates 
seriously considered the possibility that coercive interrogation could be justified except in 
extreme circumstances never likely to be met. Today, U.S. officials appear to engage in 
coercive interrogation or something very similar to it; so do other western governments; 
and the possibility that coercive interrogation may be justified in non-remote 
circumstances has entered mainstream debate.1  The task for legal scholars at this point is 
to understand how this practice fits into legal norms and traditions, and how it ought to be 
regulated. 
 
 Let us define some terms, and delimit the topic. “Coercive interrogation,” we will 
say, involves (1) the application of force, physical or mental (2) in order to extract 
information (3) necessary to save others.2  Coercive interrogation can range from the mild 
to the severe. At some point of severity, coercive interrogation becomes a species of 
“torture,” which is flatly prohibited by domestic and international law.3  Coercive 
                                                 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. 
**  Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Matthew Adler, Al 
Alschuler, Bernard Harcourt, Tracey Meares, Tom Miles, Janice Nadler, Jide Nzelibe, Ariel Porat, Cass 
Sunstein, Lesley Wexler, and workshop participants at the University of Chicago and Northwestern 
University for helpful comments; thanks to Justin Rubin for excellent research assistance. Posner thanks the 
Russell Baker Scholars Fund for financial support, while Vermeule thanks the Russell J. Parsons Research 
Fund. 
1  See Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of 
September 11 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013 (2003). Levinson’s important paper supplies evidence for the first two 
claims in text, and constitutes evidence for the third. For other recent debate about torture, see TORTURE, A 
COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (collecting major essays on the practical, philosophical and 
moral considerations surrounding the historical and contemporary use of torture). For a recent media report, 
see Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Opens Inquiry Into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
January 14, 2005, at A20. 
2  The last clause excludes the use of coercive interrogation to extract confessions to be used in later 
prosecution. We define coercive interrogation strictly as a police practice used to prevent harm to others, 
rather than as a prosecutorial tool. 
3  The principal legal sources of the prohibition on “torture” are the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified 
in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); the Senate reservations to the convention, which adopted a more restrictive 
definition of “torture”, U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings and Convention Against 
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment II(1)(a),  136 Cong. 
Coercive Interrogation 
 
 2
interrogation and torture are thus partially overlapping concepts; neither is a proper 
subset of the other. Mild coercive interrogation does not amount to legal “torture,” which 
requires that a threshold of severity be met. And there are forms of torture that are not 
coercive interrogation – for example, when torture is used as a means of political 
intimidation or oppression, indeed for any purpose other than extracting information 
necessary to save third-party lives. Our interest is in the overlapping area of these two 
concepts: coercive interrogation that (by virtue of its severity) counts as “torture.”  
Henceforth, we will use “coercive interrogation” to denote this subset. 
Given these stipulations, our inquiry is normative. We ask what legal regime 
should govern coercive interrogation. Should it ever be permissible?  If so, what legal 
rules should be used to sort permissible from impermissible cases?  Among legal 
academics, a near consensus has emerged: coercive interrogation must be kept “illegal,” 
but nonetheless permitted in certain circumstances.4  How is this trick accomplished?  
There are two popular suggestions. First, interrogators can use the necessity defense, 
which would permit government agents to argue in specific cases that violating the laws 
against coercive interrogation was necessary to discharge their duty to protect the public 
from an imminent terrorist threat. Second, interrogators can throw themselves at the 
mercy of the political process, and seek a pardon, or a favorable use of prosecutorial 
discretion, or some similar political immunization. The idea is to make coercive 
interrogation such an unattractive option for officials – they will be personally liable 
unless the strict conditions of necessity are met or the political process smiles on them – 
that they will use it only as a last resort. And this regulatory structure is meant to have an 
expressive dimension: maintaining the “illegality” of coercive interrogation expresses a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rec. S 17491-92 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1)-(2) (criminalizing torture committed outside the United 
States by U.S. nationals and persons later found in the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Torture Victim 
Protection Act) (providing a civil remedy against torturers acting under color of the law of a foreign 
nation), and Supreme Court decisions holding that “police interrogation practices that severely infringe on a 
suspect’s mental or physical autonomy violate the due process clause regardless of whether they produce 
statements that are admitted against the suspect.”  John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating 
Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture be an Option?, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, at 751 (2002). In sum, 
“[t]orture is prohibited by law throughout the United States.” U.S. Dept. of State, Initial Report of the 
United States of America to the U.N. Committee Against Torture (1999), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_ rights/torture_articles.html (cited in Parry & White, supra, at 
753).  A complication, which we will ignore, is the claim by some Bush administration officials that 
statutory and treaty restrictions on certain forms of coercive interrogation should be narrowly construed, 
and might even  be unconstitutional to the extent they prohibit the President from using coercive 
interrogation in the exercise of the Commander in Chief power. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales 
Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Part 
V, 31-39, August 1st, 2002, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf; 
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations on the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal 
Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, March 6, 2003, available at  
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf. 
4 See Henry Shue, Torture 7 PHIL. & PUB. OFF. 127 (1977); Gross, supra, at 1520; Levinson, supra, at 
2048; Jean Beth Elshtain, Reflection on the Problem of “Dirty Hands,” in Torture: A Collection, supra, at 
86-87; Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in Torture: A Collection, supra, at 297-98. 
Exceptions to this view – scholars who think law should permit coercive interrogation under some 
circumstances – include Alan Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 156-60 (2002)[hereinafter  
Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS]; Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISRAEL L. 
REV. 280 (1989). 
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moral commitment to human dignity and autonomy, while the possibility of defenses and 
pardons allows its use where appropriate. 
 The whole idea is puzzling. Police are allowed to use deadly force in order to 
prevent dangerous suspects from harming other people. Killing a person is also a serious 
harm to dignity and autonomy; although we will see arguments holding that coercive 
interrogation is worse than killing in some respects, there are other respects in which 
killing is worse than coercive interrogation. To prevent officials from engaging in 
unjustified killings, governments take the conventional route of enacting laws that 
describe the conditions under which a police officer may use deadly force, making the 
police liable only if they violate these rules in bad faith. Why shouldn’t the same system 
be used for coercive interrogation?  Or, conversely, why not prohibit police killings on 
the theory that such a prohibition would ensure that police would kill only when they 
anticipate that, after they are charged for murder, they can successfully plead the 
necessity defense or obtain a pardon? 
 
 Or consider the use of force during war. The laws and usages of war permit 
soldiers to kill others soldiers, and civilians as well. Although the killing of civilians is 
generally regarded as a moral evil, it is justified and permitted when civilian deaths are 
not disproportionate given a legitimate military target.5  If governments can authorize the 
killing of civilians in order to accomplish legitimate military objectives – which are all 
means to the end of national security – why can’t government authorize coercive 
interrogation for the same purpose?  Or, conversely, why not prohibit the killing of 
civilians and require soldiers to seek a pardon or some other form of political forgiveness, 
before or after they are tried for murder? 
 
In short, the view that coercive interrogation should remain illegal assumes that 
coercive interrogation is special in a way that distinguishes it from police killings and 
other serious harms that officials are licensed to inflict; but what makes coercive 
interrogation special? 
 
The answer, in our view, is that coercive interrogation is not special at all. If it is 
agreed that coercive interrogation is justified in certain circumstances, even narrow 
circumstances, there is no sense in treating it as “illegal” but subject to ex post political or 
legal defenses. It should be made legal, albeit subject to numerous legal protections – 
again, in this way like police shootings, wartime killings, preventive detentions, capital 
punishment, and other serious harms. The law should treat coercive interrogation the way 
it typically treats coercive governmental practices. Such practices are subject to a 
standard set of regulations defined ex ante: punishment of officials who use these 
instruments without a good justification; official immunity when they are used in good 
faith; various restrictions on the type of instrument that may be used; ex ante protections 
such as warrants;6 and so forth. Our argument is that coercive interrogation should be 
treated in the same way. 
 
                                                 
5 See Geoffrey Best, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 323 (1994). 
6 The idea of ex ante warrants for torture is taken from Alan Dershowitz. See Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM 
WORKS, supra. 
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 Part I provides a brief and selective overview of the first-order philosophical 
issues. Our purpose here is to delimit the topic in two critical ways. First, we bracket and 
ignore the claim that coercive interrogation is deontologically impermissible per se, 
whatever the facts. With a very few exceptions, this is a view nobody holds; most 
mainstream philosophers – both consequentialists and deontologists – agree that coercive 
interrogation may be morally justified under certain conditions. Second, we outline the 
rule-consequentialist view that the harms of coercive interrogation are so great, the 
occasions for its justified use so infrequent, and the risks of decisionmaker error so high, 
that coercive interrogation should never be permissible. The rule-consequentialist view 
turns on empirical and institutional premises that we discuss in Parts II and III. The only 
philosophical point is that, for either deontologists or consequentialists who believe that 
coercive interrogation can sometimes be permissible, there is no philosophical 
justification for thinking that coercive interrogation should be considered special, and 
regulated differently than the other serious, coercive harms that government inflicts. 
 
 Part II addresses second-order empirical and institutional arguments for treating 
coercive interrogation as special in the legal system (that is, regulating coercive 
interrogation by a different legal regime than applies to other serious harms government 
may inflict). These arguments rely on various tropes of second-order argument – rules 
versus standards, slippery slopes, institutional failure, corruption, and so forth – that in 
this case turn out to rest on implausible empirical premises. Our more precise point, 
however, is that if these arguments were accepted for coercive interrogation, many other 
common practices would have to be prohibited as well – for example, the shooting of 
armed suspects. 
 
 In Part III, we argue that banning a practice and then asking officials to engage in 
it (when justified) and ask for public forgiveness is not a plausible strategy for giving 
officials the right incentives. All of the rule of law reasons for creating a set of ex ante 
regulations that govern official conduct – rather than regulating official conduct ex post – 
apply as much to coercive interrogations as to other forms of law enforcement. Moreover, 
a regime of ex ante illegality and ex post license is conceptually unsustainable. If officials 
and citizens know that ex post defenses and forgiveness are available, they will factor 
their knowledge into their understanding of what the law is, diluting the material and 
expressive effects of the “ban” on coercive interrogation. Part III also provides our 
proposed framework for regulating coercive interrogation. It emphasizes three elements: 
(1) rules that state what is permitted and what is not permitted; (2) immunity for officials 
who obey the rules and punishment for those who violate the rules; (3) ex ante 
regulations such as warrants. 
 
 If coercive interrogation is not special, why is it so often swept up in a larger 
condemnation of “torture”?  Part IV speculates briefly about why coercive interrogation 
is taboo. Possible mechanisms include faulty generalization that condemns coercive 
interrogation by reference to morally indefensible torture, and by reference to salient 
historical episodes; the reliance on moral heuristics; and widespread herding or judgment 
falsification, the former causing individuals to condemn coercive interrogation because 
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others do so, the latter causing them to condemn coercive interrogation in public even if 
they privately approve it in some circumstances. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I. First-order Considerations: Moral Limits on Coercive Interrogation 
 
 Coercive interrogation is a stock subject in moral reasoning. We will outline some 
standard philosophical positions about coercive interrogation, put some off the table, and 
argue that the remainder turn crucially upon suppressed empirical and institutional 
premises, rather than the sort of conceptual claims that fall within the philosopher’s 
distinctive expertise. Our aim is to set up the discussion in Parts II and III, in which we 
criticize the empirical and institutional premises necessary to sustain the view that 
coercive interrogation should be regulated differently than other serious coercive harms. 
  
 Let us begin by looking at the following standard views; we will offer some brief 
remarks on each. 
 
1.  On deontological grounds, coercive interrogation is flatly impermissible. 
 
One might hold that coercive interrogation is absolutely impermissible, as a 
violation of rights rooted in human dignity or autonomy. This position is held by very 
few moral philosophers, if any. Here the ticking-bomb hypotheticals are important: while 
it is possible to argue that such cases are so rare that they should be ignored by a rule-
consequentialist calculus ex ante, an argument we consider below, it is fanatical to argue 
on deontological grounds that rights against coercive interrogation should not be 
overridden to prevent serious harms to others. That position denies that there can ever be 
such a thing as a justified violation of rights, or a necessary evil. Thomas Nagel seems to 
offer a brief defense of absolutism, saying that in standard cases where A sacrifices or 
harms B to save C, A can justify his conduct to B; but in the case of torture, no such 
justification is possible.7  But this view is a nonstarter, even on its own terms, for Nagel is 
equivocating about what “torture” means. If coercive interrogation that aims to save lives 
is at issue, rather than sheer sadistic cruelty, the structure of justification tracks the 
standard cases of harming B in order to save C.8 
Put differently, coercive interrogation presents a “tragic choice.”9  A view holding 
that coercive interrogation is sometimes permissible need not deny that coercive 
interrogation is a grave moral evil; of course it is. But sometimes evils, even grave ones, 
are also necessary. The absolutist deontological view fails to come to grips with the 
                                                 
7  Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 17 (Marshall Cohen et al. 
eds., 1974). 
8  Levinson, supra, at 2032. 
9  Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner 
eds.). Where tragic choices are involved, Nussbaum suggests, decisionmakers should at a minimum take 
pains to commemorate the values or rights or interests that are overridden in the service of other 
commitments. That commemoration can presumably occur in a variety of ways, from compensatory 
payments to public apologies and memorials. Nussbaum also suggests that decisionmakers should think 
dynamically, with a view to anticipating and reducing the number of future occasions that present tragic 
choices. We fully agree, and see nothing inconsistent with our views in that insight. 
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inevitability of tragic choices. In what follows, then, we will put the absolutist 
deontological view off the table. Anyone who genuinely holds it may ignore our 
argument, but we do not think there are many such people. 
 
2.  On deontological grounds, coercive interrogation is impermissible except to 
prevent “catastrophic harms.” 
   
 Position (2) is far more common. Charles Fried argues, as have many others, that  
it is permissible to kill an innocent person to save a whole nation from annihilation.10  If 
so, coercive interrogation would be permissible a fortiori in those circumstances. 
 But why only those circumstances?  Let us motivate the puzzle by imagining that 
a catastrophe principle governs the standard practice in which police officers may use 
necessary force, including lethal force, against persons who threaten harm to others. In 
this imagined regime, government officials may kill one person only to save (say) 1,000 
other people. No legal system adopts such a regime, nor is there any obvious reason to 
recommend it. Standardly the permissible ratio11 is 1 to 1: where relevant restrictions are 
met, government may kill A to save B, not merely 1,000 Bs. Obviously we can add 
further specification to either the coercive-interrogation case or the extrajudicial killing 
case: we might require that the threatened harm be “imminent,” that the force used be no 
more than necessary, and so on. What is quite mysterious, however, is why the sheer 
catastrophic size of the threatened harm should matter. The obvious alternative is to say 
that the harm prevented must simply be greater than the harm inflicted. It will not do to 
say that “harms cannot be aggregated across individuals” or “we must take seriously the 
differences between persons.”  The catastrophe exception is already in the business of 
aggregating harms across persons. Oddly, however, the catastrophe exception builds in an 
arbitrary threshold below which the harms are of insufficient weight to override 
deontological restrictions, and above which they are sufficiently weighty to do so.12 
 What typically animates a catastrophe exception is a complex of empirical and 
institutional considerations: the moral theorist is worried about the decisionmakers who 
will assess whether coercive interrogation is justified, and about the collateral effects of 
licensing those decisionmakers to make those very decisions. In this sense, the 
                                                 
10  Charles Fried, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978). 
11  We bracket the question whether the catastrophe threshold is best understood as a ratio, as opposed to 
some other sort of function. See Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 
898-900 (2000). 
12  Michael Moore responds to this point in the following way:  
[T]he worry may be that any point we pick for a threshold beyond which consequences determine 
the rightness of action may seem arbitrary. . . . [But] this is no more than the medieval worry of 
how many stones make a heap. Our uncertainty whether it takes 3, or 4, or 5, etc., does not justify 
us in thinking there are no such things as heaps. Similarly, preventing the torture of two innocents 
does not justify my torturing one, but destruction of an entire city does. 
Moore, supra, at 332. Moore’s point would be responsive if the question were a linguistic and conceptual 
one: how many stones make a “heap,” and how many deaths make a “catastrophe.”  It is not responsive to 
the different question we raise in text: why, as a matter of substantive morality, there should be any such 
catastrophe threshold in the first place. Why exactly do the deontologists want to say that saving a mere, 
say, two or three lives does not justify a single act of coercive interrogation?  Moore’ final sentence restates 
the catastrophe view, but does nothing to justify it. 
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deontologists who build in a catastrophe exception are often second-order 
consequentialists with particular institutional sensibilities.13  They do not want to 
prescribe fanatical respect for rights in scary cases, but they also worry that the exception 
will expand so as to swallow the rule; they are worried about institutional and empirical 
phenomena like slippery slopes and the effects on public attitudes of permitting coercive 
interrogation. Such worries are perfectly sensible in principle, although we argue in Parts 
II and III that they are much overblown in fact, and cannot justify distinctive treatment of 
coercive interrogation. This complex of institutional concerns, moreover, is not one about 
which philosophers as such have anything distinctive to say. 
Consider Henry Shue’s famous argument against the moral permissibility of 
torture.14  On this view, the central evil of torture – what makes it worse than 
extrajudicial killing of a menacing criminal, or (Shue’s comparison case) the killing of 
enemy combatants – is that torture violates “the prohibition against assault upon the 
defenseless.”15  Torture is worse than killing, from the standpoint of concern with dignity 
and autonomy, because torture “fail[s][] to satisfy even [the] weak constraint of being a 
‘fair fight.’”16 
This is slippery moral philosophy, even without regard to the offsetting benefits 
of coercive interrogation. Torture is worse than, say, killing enemies or armed criminals 
because the tortured captive is defenseless (ex post, at least). But killing enemies or 
armed criminals is worse than torture on another margin: killing, unlike torture, utterly 
extinguishes the victim and forever denies him any future possibility of exercising 
autonomy or enjoying human dignity. The victim of coercive interrogation may not get a 
fair fight, but at least he lives to fight another day. Shue has picked out the dimensions 
that put torture in the worst light so he can argue that it is worse than other, commonplace 
practices. The opposite tack would be to pick out the dimensions that put torture in a 
better light than other, commonplace practices. Neither approach seems obviously 
superior. 
Still, what is of interest for our purposes here is that Shue is reluctantly willing to 
entertain exceptions. “[T]he avoidance of assaults upon the defenseless is not the only, or 
even in all cases an overriding, moral consideration.”17  Shue then adduces a string of 
brief empirical and institutional arguments against permitting coercive interrogation. 
First, it will be difficult to define the limited set of conditions under which coercive 
                                                 
13  We do not claim that only institutional considerations can justify a threshold-based approach – for 
example, a norm against killing that can be overridden to save 100 lives, but not 2 lives. A strictly first-
order moral justification for such thresholds might be that the deontological injunction not to kill does not 
have infinite weight, and at some point is overbalanced by other moral obligations. See Moore, supra 
(arguing that consequences always count, even below the catastrophe threshold, but that consequences are 
outweighed by the deontological prohibition unless and until the threshold is reached – just as a buildup of 
water will eventually overspill a dam); Shelley Kagan, NORMATIVE ETHICS 78-84 (1998). For acute first-
order criticisms of this sort of justification for the threshold approach, see Alexander, supra. Our narrower 
claim is just that, in fact, Shue and many other opponents of coercive interrogation who subscribe to some 
sort of threshold-based approach tend to do so because of the second-order institutional and empirical 
concerns discussed in Part II. 
14  Shue, supra, at 127. 
15  Id. at 125. 
16  Id. at 130. 
17  Id. at 137. 
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interrogation would be permitted. Second, such limiting conditions will predictably be 
violated even if they can be defined, because all torture has a “metastatic tendency.”18  
“[A]ny practice of torture one set in motion would gain enough momentum to burst any 
bonds and become a standard operating procedure. . . . If it were ever permitted under any 
conditions, the temptation to use it would be very strong.”19 
The natural conclusion to these empirical and institutional concerns would be a 
flat prohibition on coercive interrogation, a prohibition justified on rule-consequentialist 
grounds. We take up that possibility shortly. Shue flinches from this implication, 
however, concluding in the end that the best legal regime would both “prohibit” coercive 
interrogation ex ante and yet also contain some sort of ex post mechanism for allowing 
justified interrogation to escape punishment: “The torturer should be in roughly the same 
position as someone who commits civil disobedience. . . . If the situation approximates 
those in the imaginary examples in which torture seems possible to justify, a judge can 
surely be expected to suspend the sentence.”20 
But the last idea makes the account more puzzling than ever. Given Shue’s 
pessimism about the possibility of defining circumstances under which interrogation 
should be permitted, how can law define the circumstances in which the judge should 
suspend the sentence? Or is the judge’s decision to suspend the sentence ex post a wholly 
discretionary exercise?  On Shue’s empirical premises, why will not the anticipated 
availability of ex post relief inexorably expand into a general legal blessing for coercive 
interrogation?  In what sense is coercive interrogation even “illegal” in such a regime?  
On a Holmesian account of law, what matters is that the interrogator will not, in the end, 
go to jail. Most striking of all is that Shue’s whole discussion of justified interrogation is 
untethered from moral theory, his area of presumptive expertise. The latter part of Shue’s 
argument is entirely empirical, but Shue gives the reader little beyond a set of stylized 
assumptions about what the legal, political and social effects of interrogation simply must 
be. 21 
 
3. On rule-consequentialist grounds, coercive interrogation is impermissible. 
 
The deontological parts of Shue’s argument establish a moral presumption against 
coercive interrogation, subject to a consequentialist override; the subsequent move, one 
that Shue introduces on the quiet, is a prediction about the costs and benefits22 of coercive 
interrogation across a range of cases. Here all views short of strict deontology – both 
ordinary consequentialism and the modified deontological position that admits a 
                                                 
18  Id. at 143. 
19  Id. at 141. 
20  Id. at 143 (emphasis added). 
21  For his large propositions about the nature and effects of torture, Shue cites two documents from 
Amnesty International. See Shue, supra. 
22  Here and throughout, we mean nothing philosophically contentious by the terms “cost” and “benefit.”  
Any consequentialist view needs a value theory that labels some consequences as good, others as bad; we 
label the good consequences “benefits” and the bad consequences “costs.”  (Note that, as discussed below, 
violations of rights might themselves count as bads, to be compared to other goods and bads). In particular, 
we do not mean to invoke cost-benefit analysis in the technical sense; we do not suggest that costs and 
benefits must be monetized through a willingness-to-pay measure. 
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catastrophe exception – must assess the first-order and second-order consequences of 
coercive interrogation.23 
Putting aside Shue’s modified deontological view, the assessment of 
consequences can proceed in either an act-consequentialist or a rule-consequentialist 
framework.24  For act-consequentialists, the important issue is whether the benefits of 
coercive interrogation exceed the costs in particular cases. Rule-consequentialists, by 
contrast, ask which (set of) rules about coercive interrogation will produce the greatest 
net benefits. We have already seen the straightforward act-consequentialist argument for 
permitting coercive interrogation, especially in the standard ticking-bomb hypotheticals 
discussed above, so we will focus here on the rule-consequentialist alternative. We 
address here the second-order arguments for adopting a flat rule-consequentialist ban on 
interrogation, and find those arguments implausible. In Parts II and III we proceed to ask 
whether there is any good reason to have a legal regime that differs from the moral 
regime. We suggest that there is none; the legal system should authorize interrogation in 
some narrow range of circumstances, suitably defined and regulated ex ante. 
The rule-consequentialist argument against coercive interrogation emphasizes 
second-order considerations. Perhaps cases in which coercive interrogation is justified to 
prevent greater harms are in fact extremely rare; perhaps front-line moral decisionmakers 
would be prone to commit error by using coercive interrogation in cases where its costs 
outweigh its benefits; perhaps there are important dynamic effects, such as the risk of a 
slippery slope from tightly regulated coercive interrogation to widespread casual torture. 
On this approach, coercive interrogation is declared morally impermissible on an ex ante 
cost-benefit calculus, not because there are no cases in which coercive interrogation 
would be justified from an ex post perspective – the rule consequentialist agrees that 
there are – but because it is predictable ex ante that licensing decisionmakers to attempt 
to identify such cases will do more harm than good. We comment on the empirical merits 
of similar second-order arguments in Parts II and III, suggesting that arguments for 
prohibiting all coercive interrogation because of concerns about the decisional capacities 
of officials in the legal system are unduly pessimistic. Here we will confine ourselves to 
some remarks about the presuppositions of the rule-consequentialist approach. 
It is important to acknowledge that a rule-consequentialist prohibition on coercive 
interrogation might turn out to be correct, in light of the facts. The great strength of this 
                                                 
23  The distinction between deontology and consequentialism does not track the distinction between rights-
based and welfarist moral theories. One may hold a consequentialist view on which the effects of actions 
on rights are themselves among the consequences to be evaluated, in which case the welfare consequences 
of actions are not the only consequences of interest. See Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 3 (1982). This possibility is orthogonal to our discussion here, but nothing we say is inconsistent with 
it. The non-welfarist consequentialist, who counts rights-violations as bads, either does or does not admit 
some rate of tradeoff between the goal of avoiding rights-violations and other goals. If the rate of tradeoff is 
zero, we will label the position “deontological,” strictly to simplify our terminology. If there is some 
positive rate of tradeoff, we label the position “consequentialist,” again for simplicity. In the latter case, 
rights-violations count as a “cost” in the sense defined above, and are folded into the cost-benefit calculus. 
24  There is also a possible motive-consequentialist approach, on which actors attempt to develop the 
character or disposition that will tend to produce the actions with the best overall consequences. We will 
ignore this variant in what follows. 
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approach is that it cannot, by its nature, be ruled out of bounds in the abstract. Everything 
depends on the actual values of the second-order variables that the rule-consequentialist 
argument identifies. 
Yet it is equally important to recognize that the rule-consequentialist approach 
purchases this immunity from abstract critique for a price: the rule-consequentialist 
approach is hostage to the facts as they actually turn out to be, in whatever empirical 
domain is at issue. Because the relevant facts vary over time and across domains of 
morality and law, it is extremely implausible (although not logically impossible) that the 
rule-consequentialist calculus will counsel a flat prohibition on coercive interrogation 
always and everywhere. At some times, the harms that coercive interrogation might 
prevent will be greater and more likely to occur than at other times, and the rule-
consequentialist must take this into account. So too, in some polities, under some 
circumstances, coercive interrogation may be justified on this approach even if it cannot 
be justified in other polities under other circumstances. The faithful rule-consequentialist 
cannot subscribe to any timeless and universal prohibition on coercive interrogation. 
A related point is that from the rule-consequentialist standpoint a flat prohibition 
on coercive interrogation is a kind of extreme or corner solution, and as such suspect. For 
any such rule, there will generally be a more permissive substitute, such as a rule-with-
exceptions that permits some coercive interrogation under circumstances that can be 
clearly defined ex ante. Consider a rule-with-exceptions that bans coercive interrogation 
unless officials know to a certainty that 1,000 people will imminently die. More 
generally, the rule-consequentialist is obliged to consider a range of intermediate regimes 
short of a flat prohibition on coercive interrogation. The corner solution is salient but not 
superior, unless that salience itself produces some consequentialist benefit. 
The final point is one we will emphasize in Parts II and III. The second-order 
arguments that support a prohibition on coercive interrogation are, in many cases, pitched 
at a level of generality that would also condemn other standard practices in which 
officials are legally licensed to inflict serious harms, such as extrajudicial killing. The 
rule-consequentialist who subscribes to a prohibition on coercive interrogation bears the 
burden of confronting those practices, either by extending the prohibition to include 
them, or by offering some empirical consideration that makes coercive interrogation 
special. We subsequently argue that no such consideration can be shown to exist. 
Whatever the merits of our answer, however, the rule-consequentialist cannot avoid the 
question. 
To summarize the ground covered so far: we will bracket and ignore genuinely 
absolutist deontological arguments that coercive interrogation is impermissible per se. 
This position is very rarely defended, in light of cases suggesting that coercive 
interrogation is at least sometimes necessary to prevent third-party harms. Far more 
common are positions that incorporate consequences in some way. Of these, the two most 
prominent are (1) a modified deontological position that incorporates an exception or 
override to a baseline deontological prohibition, where coercive interrogation can prevent 
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“catastrophic” harms; and (2) a rule-consequentialist prohibition.25  Both positions both 
turn crucially upon empirical and institutional premises or assumptions, especially a set 
of predictions about the second-order effects of the possible legal regimes. We now turn 
to those second-order questions. 
II. Second-Order Considerations: The Empirical and Institutional Context 
 
 In this Part, we assume that the consequentialists and the non-absolutist 
deontologists are right – that, at least in limited circumstances, coercive interrogation is 
morally justified. This assumption, however, provides only a starting point for making 
policy choices. The further question is whether coercive interrogation can be justified in 
light of what we call second-order considerations about the legal system, and about the 
institutional context in which coercive interrogation would take place. Some critics of 
coercive interrogation – even those who acknowledge first-order moral arguments for 
permitting coercive interrogation in catastrophic scenarios – argue that the second-order 
considerations are decisive with respect to real legal systems: they argue, in essence that 
even if a perfect government that made no errors should have the power to engage in 
coercive interrogation in extreme cases, no real world government should have such a 
power. In the real world, government officials make mistakes, and actions that may be 
justified on a narrowly instrumental calculus have unforeseeable institutional or systemic 
effects that render them unjustified in general. 
 
 We address three groups of second-order considerations,26 and argue that they are 
exceptionally weak. Second-order considerations do not justify a flat ban on coercive 
interrogation. 
 
A. Rules and Standards 
 
 The first argument is that catastrophic scenarios are too rare to justify authorizing 
police to engage in coercive interrogation. Suppose that you think that coercive 
interrogation can be justified only to save more than one thousand lives, and even then 
that coercive interrogation would be justified only if it was reasonably certain that the 
subject would provide the relevant information that could be used to save the lives. 
Outside of war, such scenarios are extremely rare; indeed, we can think of only one, in 
the United States or any other western country, in recent history: the September 11 attack 
– and even here it seems unlikely that the authorities would have been able to stop the 
                                                 
25  We also bracket the possible view that coercive interrogation is not merely morally permissible but 
indeed morally required, where lives are in the balance. Where coercive interrogation might save third-
party lives, to fail to interrogate might be seen as itself a morally objectionable choice, a sort of moral 
squeamishness not justified by any plausible version of the distinction between acts and omissions. (Thanks 
to Cass Sunstein for this point). See also Elshtain, supra, at 87 (“Far greater moral guilt falls on a person in 
authority who permits the deaths of hundreds of innocents rather than choosing to ‘torture’ one guilty or 
complicit person.”); Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses from German 
Law, 48 AMER. J. COMP. L. 661,  669-71 (2000) (arguing that under the German constitution, which 
requires government to aid individuals, torture may be constitutionally obligated). 
26  They have been recently summarized by Oren Gross, though he sees six; several, though, are versions of 
others. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1501-11 (2004). 
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attack if they had had the power to engage in coercive interrogation.27  Thus, the benefits 
of allowing coercive interrogation would be vanishingly small. 
 
 At the same time, the costs could be high. If officials are allowed to engage in 
coercive interrogation, then no doubt they would make errors and sometimes employ this 
measure against people who have no information about a pending terrorist attack or have 
information only about small-scale attacks whose seriousness does not justify the use of 
coercive interrogation. Unnecessary infliction of pain is an intrinsic cost, whether the 
suspects are innocent or guilty of some crime. If the benefits of permitting coercive 
interrogation are low in an ex ante sense, and the costs are high because of unavoidable 
error, then a flat ban on coercive interrogation would be justified.28 
 
 This argument is a familiar point about rules and standards. Rules are simple and 
easy to administer but are overinclusive and underinclusive, and thus produce results that 
deviate from the normative optimum that the rules are supposed to approximate. 
Standards directly incorporate the normative ideal, or approximate it more closely than 
rules do, but, because they are harder to understand, are more likely to result in error by 
decisionmakers. Rules are likely to be better than standards when decision costs are high 
relative to error costs. 
 
 The rule-consequentialist argument against coercive interrogation amounts to the 
claim that a bright line rule – a blanket prohibition on coercive interrogation – is superior 
to a standard that permits coercive interrogation in “extreme circumstances” or the like; 
or, for that matter, a slightly vaguer rule such as one that permitted coercive interrogation 
“only when it is reasonably certain to save more than one thousand lives.”  The reason is 
that high decision costs under a standard or a vaguer rule would produce high costs – 
instances of unnecessary coercive interrogation – without producing large enough 
benefits to justify these costs, given the rarity of extreme circumstances. This argument is 
conceptually coherent, and superficially attractive; but we believe it to be flawed in point 
of fact. 
 
Let us begin with the simplest question, whether coercive interrogation works 
(where by “works” we mean “produces information that saves lives, in a nontrivial range 
of cases”). If coercive interrogation does not work, if it is all cost and no benefit, then 
there are no tradeoffs to be made, and both the moral and institutional questions are easy. 
This is a tempting view,29 but it runs aground on the evidence. 
 
                                                 
27  See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
254-277, 339-357 (2004) (indicating that the problem was not that the authorities could not extract 
information from suspects, but that they were unprepared for the type of terrorist activity that would occur 
on 9/11). 
28 See, e.g., Parry & Welsh, supra, at 762. 
29 One can eliminate the need to address difficult moral and legal questions by insisting that coercive 
interrogation is ineffective either because it produces no information or because it radicalizes one’s enemy 
(see, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 109-112 
(2003)). We are skeptical about this approach for reasons given by Levinson; see Levinson, supra. 
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We will focus on the Israeli evidence. Much of that evidence is anecdotal or 
impressionistic, but it strongly suggests that coercive interrogation saves lives. The 
Landau Commission found that  
 
[E]ffective activity by the [General Security Service, or GSS] to 
thwart terrorist acts is impossible without use of the tool of the 
interrogation of suspects, in order to extract from them vital information 
known only to them, and unobtainable by other methods. 
The effective interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible 
without the use of means of pressure, in order to overcome an obdurate 
will not to disclose information and to overcome the fear of the person 
under interrogation that harm will befall him from his own organization, if 
he does reveal information.30 
 
In a report submitted to the United Nations, Israel represented that GSS investigations 
had foiled 90 planned terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, car bombings, 
kidnaps and murders.31  Although the Israeli Supreme Court later held that GSS practices 
of coercive interrogation violated rights of human dignity, and thus required clear 
legislative authorization, the Court acknowledged that coercive interrogation works. Here 
is one example the Court gave: 
  
A powerful explosive device [was found in the applicant’s village] 
subsequent to the dismantling and interrogation of the terrorist cell to 
which he belonged. Uncovering this explosive device thwarted an attack . . 
. . According to GSS investigators, the applicant possessed additional 
crucial information which he only revealed as a result of their 
interrogation. Revealing this information immediately was essential to 
safeguarding state and regional security and preventing danger to human 
life.32 
 
Many people are reluctant to believe that coercive interrogation works, not only 
because they convince themselves that morally bad practices must also be ineffective, but 
also because they have in the back of their minds a picture of rogue police beating 
suspects in a haphazard or indiscriminate effort to gain information. As the Israeli 
experience shows, however, coercive interrogation can be done well or poorly. GSS 
interrogators work, or worked, under elaborate guidelines concerning the amount and 
types of coercion that can be used, and under the constant supervision of superiors who 
must provide administrative approval for the application of particular methods.33  
                                                 
30 Israeli Government Press Office, Commission of Inquiry Into the Methods of Investigation of the 
General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity 78 (1987), reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146, 
184 (1989) [hereinafter Landau Report]. 
31 United Nations, Committee Against Torture; Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1996, Addendum, Israel  7 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/Add.2/Rev.1 (1997) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. 
32 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1474 (Sept 6, 1999) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Public Committee Against Torture in Israel]. 
33  U.N. Report, supra, at 3-4. 
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Professionalism and training can increase the benefits of coercive interrogation, by 
increasing the chances of obtaining useful information, and decrease the harms to those 
interrogated. 
 
 If coercive interrogation is effective, then the cost of a bright line rule that bans it 
in all circumstances is high. This cost consists of the lives lost because information was 
not obtained before the bomb explodes. Against this cost, we must compare the benefit of 
the ban: the avoided cases where government agents unjustifiably engage in coercive 
interrogation. Here, we can revert to the philosophical literature and the Israeli 
experience, both of which suggest that the benefits can be greater than the costs, at least 
in certain circumstances. The only issue is whether the error costs are so extreme that 
only a bright-line ban can be justified. 
 
 There are two main reasons for thinking that the answer to this question is no. 
First, the question, as posed, assumes an implausibly simple policy choice: either a flat 
ban or a vague standard that will be easily abused. But there are many alternatives that 
fall between these extremes. Coercive interrogation could be limited to cases where a 
certain number of lives are at stake – say, 1000. It could be limited to cases where the 
subjects are known to be members of Al Qaeda or another group that has proved its 
hostility and lethalness. It could be subject to special ex ante controls; its use could be 
limited to specially trained and monitored groups within the government; the type of 
coercive interrogation could be circumscribed so that only “moderate” measures are used; 
and so forth. We will discuss these design options in more detail below;34 for now, it is 
sufficient to point out that the policy choices are more nuanced than supporters of the 
complete ban allow. 
 
Second, ordinary and rarely criticized law enforcement practices already assume 
that the cost of unjustified coercive interrogation is not extremely high. Existing policy – 
which permits police interrogations but bans coercive interrogation – already accepts the 
possibility that police will err and use unjustified coercion. The distinction between 
coercive and noncoercive interrogations is fuzzy and subject to much debate and 
litigation. Even a decisionmaker acting in good faith can cross the line, and engage in 
coercion. If we cared so much about preventing torture that we were unwilling to tolerate 
even a single instance of it, then we ought to restrict even noncoercive interrogations. A 
prophylactic ban on all interrogations, for example, would eliminate coercive 
interrogation. 
 
 But no government is willing to go so far; presumably, the reason is that the 
benefits of noncoercive interrogation are high enough to justify a fuzzy rule or standard, 
even one that results in occasional erroneous decisions to coercively interrogate, and that 
the costs of coercive interrogation are, though high, not as high as people might initially 
claim. But then it follows that unless coercive interrogation is known to be ineffective – 
an implausible assumption, as we have argued – it may be appropriate to permit it with a 
fuzzy rule or standard that limits it to cases where the benefits exceed the costs. 
 
                                                 
34 See Part III. 
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 The comparison with police shootings is again instructive. The costs of police 
shootings are extremely high – people are wounded or killed, unnecessarily when the 
police make errors, as they unavoidably do – but the benefits are also high: innocent lives 
are saved. Rather than banning police shootings because of the high costs of error, 
governments regulate them. And rather than using very clear rules, the regulations are 
replete with standards – references to “justified” force, or force that the officer 
“reasonably believes to be necessary,” are common.35  Why shouldn’t the government 
use the same system of regulation for interrogations? 
 
To be sure, it may be that the cost-benefit calculus is slightly different for 
coercive interrogation and for extrajudicial killings.  Perhaps extracting information is not 
as important as preventing immediate violence; extrajudicial killing will often save 
another life with high probability, while extracting information is a more speculative 
enterprise and will less frequently save lives.  On the other hand, when coercive 
interrogation does save lives, it may often save more lives than does extrajudicial killing.  
The cost-benefit calculus must consider not only the probability of averting harm, but the 
magnitude of the harms averted.  Overall, then, it is hardly obvious that the net cost-
benefit calculus is different in the two cases; and even if there is a difference, it is 
unlikely that the difference is great enough to justify a complete ban on coercive 
interrogation alone. We will return to the possibility of an empirical distinction between 
police killings and coercive interrogation below, in III.D. 
  
 What we have said so far applies, with the same force, to the many subtle 
variations on the rule/standard argument that can be found in the literature. For example, 
it has been suggested that if officials must balance the costs and benefits of coercive 
interrogation on a case by case basis, they will inevitably underestimate the costs and 
overestimate the benefits.36  It is not clear why this would be true though it is possible: 
maybe officials underestimate the costs because they don’t sympathize with the subject, 
or because the officials themselves become dehumanized by their involvement in 
coercive interrogation and lose the ability to perceive the impact of their actions on the 
subject; or maybe they overestimate the benefits because they have personal or 
institutional reasons for exaggerating the likelihood of threats. But, putting aside the fact 
that all of these worries are pure speculation unencumbered by serious empirical support, 
they apply with equal force to noncoercive interrogation; they are simply an aspect of 
                                                 
35 While state statutes list some specific circumstances when deadly force is allowed, such as acting as the 
executioner at the orders of a competent court, they also create more general standards for when force is 
“justified.” See e.g.,  Code of Ala. §13A-3-27 (2004) (saying “A peace officer is justified in using deadly 
physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he believes it necessary . . . (2) To defend 
himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of deadly force.”); §720 
ILCS 5/7-5 (saying, “[A peace officer] is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to 
be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend 
himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.”); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-404 (2004) (saying, 
“A peace officer . . . is justified in using deadly force when: . . . (c) the officer reasonably believes that the 
use of deadly force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.”).  
State statutes are not the last word, of course.  In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court found 
unconstitutional a statute that authorized deadly force against a fleeing suspect who was neither armed nor 
dangerous.  Most state statutes, however, already comply with Garner’s rules.   
36 Gross, supra, at 1507. 
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police work. If they are valid concerns, then they provide a general case for restricting the 
police, subjecting them to public oversight, and so forth; but they do not apply specially 
to coercive interrogation, justifying a flat ban where other areas of police work seem 
appropriately governed by standards or soft rules. 
 
 Taken together, these considerations suggest that the critics of coercive 
interrogation have not yet provided a justification for an absolute ban. Most police work 
is governed by standards or soft rules; unless there is something special about coercive 
interrogation, the same approach should be used for that measure. 
 
B. Slippery Slopes 
 
 The slippery slope argument holds that even if coercive interrogation survives a 
narrow assessment of its advantages and disadvantages – one that compared the 
immediate benefits from obtaining information and the harms to the subject of the 
interrogation – it is nonetheless unjustified because of its more remote effects. Once we 
allow coercive interrogation, the argument goes, we won’t be able to stop: torture will be 
used to punish convicted criminals; to extract information from suspects and even 
witnesses in routine criminal cases; and to intimidate political opponents.37 
 
 Slippery slope arguments identify a possible unintended negative consequence of 
a particular policy; if this consequence is likely enough, then it ought to count as a cost in 
the cost-benefit calculus used to evaluate the rule.38  But the fact that bad consequences 
are possible is not itself a sufficient reason for banning an activity. Proponents of a 
slippery slope argument bear the burden of showing that the unintended consequence is 
likely enough that it should be included in the calculus; this involves (1) identifying a 
mechanism by which the initial policy choice might lead to the adverse consequence; and 
(2) providing some evidence that this mechanism operates in fact.39  Proponents of a flat 
ban on coercive interrogation have not met this burden. 
 
 The first argument is that once the taboo against coercive interrogation is 
shattered, the psychological constraints against inflicting pain will fall away, brutalizing 
the law enforcement officials who use coercive interrogation. Police who justifiably use 
coercive interrogation in one setting – the prevention of catastrophic terrorist attacks – 
will start using it to extract information or even confessions from petty criminals and 
even innocent bystanders who are thought to be withholding information about a crime 
that they have witnessed.40  Alternatively, even if the shattering of the taboo does not 
itself increase police brutality, sadists may self-select into police work at greater rates 
than they otherwise would. 
 
                                                 
37 Gross, supra, at 1508-09; Seth Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints 
on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 278 (2003); Parry & White, supra, at 763; 
Mordechai Kremnitzer , The Landau Commission Report: Was the Security Service Subordinated to the 
Law or the Law to the “Needs” of the Security Service, 23 ISRAEL L. REV. 254, 254-57, 161-62 (1989). 
38  Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
39  Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). 
40  Kremnitzer, supra, at 260-61. 
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These arguments are not supported by evidence.41  One could make the same 
argument about police shootings: if the government allows police to shoot people, then 
police will be morally corrupted and treat suspects with unnecessary brutality, or would-
be Rambos will self-select into police work in large numbers. But this does not appear to 
have occurred, or, if it has, this adverse consequence of permitting the police to use 
deadly force is universally seen as justified by the need to protect crime victims. And if 
people who routinely inflict pain on others lose their capacity to sympathize with their 
subjects, there are a variety of institutional mechanisms42 that can be used to confine 
coercive interrogation to the appropriate setting, just as training, contractual incentives 
and criminal penalties, citizen oversight, and other institutional arrangements are used to 
prevent police shootings from slipping out of control. 
 
A second and related argument is that society as a whole is brutalized if police 
engage in coercive interrogation. The shattering of the taboo against coercive 
interrogation would result in the public and the government acquiring a new enthusiasm 
not just for this measure, which could result in its routine use as an instrument of law 
enforcement, but also for torture, as a device for punishing criminals, intimidating 
political opponents, and demonstrating the power of the state. 
 
The problem with this argument is the same as the problem with the first: it is 
pure speculation, belied by our experiences with other measures. Take capital 
punishment. One could argue that killing convicted criminals is just as likely to brutalize 
society as torturing them. Yet the trend has been in the opposite direction. Historically, 
nations have cut back on capital punishment rather than expanding it; this has been driven 
by revulsion against its use against minor criminals or political opponents. In the United 
States today, there appears to be little pressure to expand the death penalty – to, say, 
ordinary murders or robbery or rape. 
 
The argument recalls the various “ratchet” theories, which hold that the adoption 
of new law enforcement measures that restrict civil liberties inevitably become 
entrenched, and thus the starting point when new emergencies generate pressure for 
aggressive law enforcement, so that there is always a downward pressure on civil 
liberties. These theories have never been adequately defended.43  In the context of torture, 
there have been many examples of western countries adopting coercive interrogation and 
similar aggressive practices as temporary measures to deal with a particular emergency – 
France in Algeria, Britain against the IRA – and then abandoning them when the 
                                                 
41 One scholar argues that the CIA contributed to the destabilization of the Philippines and the overthrow of 
the Shah of Iran by training officers in the techniques of psychological torture. See Alfred W. McCoy, 
Cruel Science: CIA Torture and U.S. Foreign Policy, 19 NEW ENGLAND J. OF PUB. POL’Y 209, 228-31 
(2005). But his evidence is exceedingly weak, and consistent with the opposite conclusion: that the 
Philippines would be less stable, and the Shah’s government would have collapsed earlier, had they not 
used torture. As McCoy concedes that these countries would have used torture even without the CIA’s 
help, and as he argues only that the CIA’s contribution consisted of training foreign police in the techniques 
of psychological torture, his evidence does not support the claim that the use of torture by the CIA 
“metastasized,” resulting in unintended injury to friendly governments. 
42  We discuss these mechanisms below. 
43  Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003). 
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emergency is over.44  Israel uses coercive interrogation against suspected terrorists; this 
practice has not spread to other settings, as far as we know.45  Far from desensitizing the 
public to violence and pain, the use of coercive interrogation and similar measures can 
inspire revulsion, and a renewal of a commitment not to use them except in extreme 
circumstances.46 
 
  Capital punishment, coercive interrogation, the use of deadly force against 
dangerous suspects, and similar law enforcement devices are used, or not used, as 
circumstances warrant. It is possible that they have unpredictable second-order effects on 
public psychology, but we do not know the direction of these effects, and the historical 
record does not support the claim that harsh police tactics cannot be controlled but must 
inevitably become harsher. Here again, we emphasize that everything depends on what 
the facts turn out to be. Because arguments about policies such as coercive interrogation 
and capital punishment are hostage to what the facts show, in particular domains, there is 
no slope at all, just a series of discrete policy problems all arrayed on a level. Support for 
coercive interrogation need not commit policymakers to support for punitive torture or 
slavery or any other horrors. 
 
 A third concern is that once coercive interrogation is authorized, officials will, 
over time, become more and more expert in using it effectively. As this happens, one of 
the main objections to coercive interrogation – that it is ineffective, or is often used when 
it is ineffective – will disappear, and thus coercive interrogation, according to the cost-
benefit calculus, will be used more often. Although this theory may be right, it implies 
only that coercive interrogation will become more common, not that it will be used in an 
unjustified fashion or produce some other adverse consequence.47 
 
C. Symbolism 
 
 Several arguments in the literature can be placed under the heading of symbolism. 
These arguments often are hard to distinguish from slippery slope arguments but we 
consider them separately because their force does not depend on slippery slope concerns 
being valid. 
 
 First, one might argue that coercive interrogation is in tension with the 
“symbolism of human dignity and the inviolability of the human body,” in the words of 
                                                 
44 See Benjamin Stora, ALGERIA: 1830-2000: A SHORT HISTORY 49-51 (Jane Marie Todd trans. 2001) 
(describing the use of torture by French forces to defeat an insurrection in Algiers). Kreimer, supra, at 280 
n. 10 (discussing the British use of coercive interrogation in Northern Ireland in the 1970s). 
45 Landau Report, supra, at 152 (“the GSS is very scrupulous about not accepting from persons under 
interrogation false confessions concerning untrue facts.”). 
46 See Stora, supra, at 87-93 (describing the reactions of the French public to the use of torture in Algeria). 
47  Similarly for the idea that the permissibility of coercive interrogation will dampen police incentives to 
engage in research and development of new technologies for discovering information.  If coercive 
interrogation works well, there is little reason for law to expend large resources stimulating such research 
and development.  Any technique that works also dampens the search for substitute techniques, but that is 
no objection from a normative point of view. 
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Oren Gross.48  We just don’t understand this argument. Imprisoning criminals and using 
violence and deadly force against them when they threaten others also are inconsistent 
with human dignity and the inviolability of the human body, but they are nonetheless 
tolerated because of their benefits. Gross also argues that a flat ban on coercive 
interrogation gives “notice that fundamental rights and values are not forsaken.”49  But 
this giving of notice is, or ought to be, parasitic on the underlying substantive decision. If 
we allow coercive interrogation, we don’t want to give notice that we are not allowing 
coercive interrogation, or endorse values that are inconsistent with it. 
 
 Second, the ban on coercive interrogation might have an “educational function.”50  
It teaches both Americans and foreigners about human dignity and the value of human 
rights. But if coercive interrogation – like imprisonment, or police shootings – is justified, 
and thus consistent with our values, then we shouldn’t want to teach people that coercive 
interrogation is wrong; quite the contrary. If coercive interrogation is justified, a ban on 
coercive interrogation might teach people to overvalue the avoidance of pain and 
undervalue human life. 
 
 Third, Jeremy Waldron argues that the ban on coercive interrogation is a “legal 
archetype” that expresses “the spirit of a whole structured area of doctrine, and does so 
vividly, effectively, publicly, establishing the significance of that area for the entire legal 
enterprise.”51  The policy expressed by the ban is that “law is no longer brutal; law is no 
longer savage; law no longer rules through abject fear and terror.”52  Other legal 
archetypes, according to Waldron, are the writ of habeas corpus, the holding in Brown v. 
Board of Education, the rule of adverse possession, and the doctrine of consideration.53  
As the last two examples make clear, Waldron holds that a legal archetype is a sort of 
heuristic device that “expresses or epitomizes the spirit of a whole structured area of 
doctrine”54 and thereby helps people organize a body of doctrine around its dominant 
principles. 
 
Heuristics may have instrumental value, but Waldron exaggerates their 
significance if he is claiming that the elimination of a heuristic will undermine, or even 
result in serious confusion about, an area of law or policy. Just as we could eliminate the 
doctrine of consideration without losing “contract law’s commitment to market-based 
notions of fairness,”55 we could eliminate a ban against coercive interrogation without 
losing the criminal justice system’s commitment to avoiding unnecessary brutality. Here 
Waldron makes a typical philosopher’s mistake by attempting to derive concrete 
                                                 
48  Gross, supra, at 1504. 
49  Id. 
50  Id.; see also Parry & White, supra, at 763. 
51 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House 40 (unpublished 
manuscript,  2004). Waldron actually casts his argument as a condemnation of “torture,” but he focuses 
almost exclusively on what we call coercive interrogation, and we address his argument only to that extent.  
52 Id. (emphasis in original). 
53 Id., at 42. 
54  Id., at 37. 
55 Id., at 43. The consideration doctrine does not exist in Civil Code countries, which are just as committed 
to market principles as the U.S. or the UK. 
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conclusions from premises that are too general or abstract to cut between policy choices 
on the ground. The commitment to minimize law’s brutality is on both sides of this 
argument. Where coercive interrogation can save lives, not engaging in it might seem the 
more brutal choice, especially to those whose lives are at stake. Those people might 
reasonably hold that there is a sort of brutal callousness, a self-absorbed moral preciosity, 
in the decision to preserve the law’s archetypal integrity by permitting third-party deaths 
to go unprevented.56 
 
 Like many second-order arguments, Waldron’s account trivializes the policies 
that he is trying to invest with significance. Consider how his argument might apply to 
the debate about capital punishment. The reason that critics oppose capital punishment is 
not that it expresses brutality; the reason is that it kills people. Similarly, the only strong 
argument against torture is that it causes pain. When we object to brutal laws, we object 
because they are brutal, not because they “express brutality.”  If we nonetheless tolerate 
them because they produce some good, their symbolic meaning falls by the wayside, in 
part because that meaning is qualified: a brutal law that does good no longer expresses 
brutality in unambiguous form. Indeed, such laws do no more than symbolize the 
government’s willingness to produce the greatest possible good overall. On this view, a 
system of regulated coercive interrogation would have the same symbolic effect as the 
use of deadly force by police and the laws of war that permit the killing of civilians in the 
course of destroying a legitimate military target. 
 
 There seems to be a strong feeling that if the U.S. abandons its ban on coercive 
interrogation, the rest of the world will not only imitate American policy – which, of 
course, is not objectionable if American policy is correct, as we are assuming for the sake 
of argument. The rest of the world will do worse; seeing that the U.S. endorses the 
infliction of pain for the purpose of interrogation, other countries will use it for 
punishment, show trials, and so forth.57 
 
 This argument rests on the assumption of American exceptionalism, the notion 
that, in Ronald Reagan’s words, America is a “shining city on a hill” that the rest of the 
world looks up to and emulates.58  Once America is shown to be a “normal” state, its 
ideals will cease to inspire others. There are many reasons for doubting this account. 
First, the U.S. is not as exceptional as it once was: there are many liberal democracies 
today; the U.S. is just one. Second, the U.S. increasingly has a reputation as a 
conservative, religious, punitive, and even militaristic country; its use of coercive 
interrogation in limited circumstances would have no more than a marginal effect when 
the U.S. is already heavily criticized for policies that are not going to change anytime 
soon – capital punishment, ungenerous social welfare policies, aggressive use of its 
military, disinclination to cooperate in international organizations, and so forth. Coercive 
interrogation is just one more item on this list, unlikely by itself to change the reputation 
of the United States. Third, the U.S.’s reputation rests not only on its commitment to 
                                                 
56  See Moore, supra, at 329; Elshtain, supra. 
57  Levinson, supra, at 2052-53; Parry & White, supra, at 763. 
58  Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan 11, 1989), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF RONALD 
REAGAN 1988-89, 1718, 1722; he was quoting John Winthrop. 
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liberal principles, but on its lack of dogmatism about them, and especially the pragmatic 
way that it has relaxed them when necessary to counter internal or external threats. 
Liberal countries that collapse into chaos, that cannot protect their citizens, or that are 
bullied by authoritarian countries or terrorist organizations, are not attractive role models. 
 
 Another argument that is sometimes made is that a ban on coercive interrogation 
“facilitates the government’s claim to the moral high ground in the battle against 
terrorists.”59  This argument recalls the old cold war arguments that the U.S. should take 
the moral high ground in international relations in order to win the propaganda war 
against the Soviet Union.60  These arguments had force then, and ought to have force 
now. Even if coercive interrogation is justified in some settings, its use will almost 
certainly be a public relations setback – just as the Abu Ghraib scandal was – and fodder 
for those who want to portray the United States as corrupt and immoral. Part of the 
problem for the United States is to persuade the undecided living in Muslim countries 
that they should throw in their lot with the West and not with Islamic radicalism. If the 
law enforcement methods of the U.S. are no more attractive than the law enforcement 
methods espoused by Islamic radicals, then a valuable propaganda tool is lost. 
 
 But there are countervailing considerations. The West must project an image of 
strength as well as virtue; undecided Muslims and Arabs will not cast their lot with 
governments that cannot protect themselves and their people, as we noted before. But 
whatever the force of these arguments, they only identify one cost that must be balanced 
against the benefits of coercive interrogation. The public relations effect of coercive 
interrogation is just one factor among many. It may justify restricting coercive 
interrogation more than the narrow instrumental calculus suggests; but it is hard to see 
how it could justify a flat prohibition. 
 
III.  Legal Regulation of Coercive Interrogation 
 
A. Outlaw and Forgive 
 
 In Part II, we criticized the argument that there should be a total legal ban on 
coercive interrogation. But, as we noted, many critics of coercive interrogation believe 
that there should be a kind of political escape valve, so that coercive interrogation will 
occur, despite the legal ban, if there is a catastrophic scenario. The standard view seems 
to be that we should simply maintain the status quo: coercive interrogation remains 
illegal and officials who nonetheless employ it may seek public vindication, including a 
pardon,61 although some authors seem to want to adjust the status quo by, for example, 
encouraging elected officials to issue pardons when coercive interrogation was morally 
justified, or creating special or expedited procedures for applying for pardons, and so 
                                                 
59  Gross, supra, at 1505. 
60  See Mary L. Dudziak, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2000). 
61 Shue, supra, at 127; Gross, supra, at 1520; Levinson, supra, at 2048. A related view can be found in Eyal 
Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture of Suspected Terrorists, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
596 (1997). 
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forth.62  The latter approach begins to look like one of legalizing coercive interrogation – 
in effect, if not as a matter of form – but we will put this wrinkle aside and evaluate the 
“outlaw and forgive” (OAF) approach, as we shall call it. 
 
 OAF comes in two flavors. The first places the responsibility to forgive with 
political officials such as prosecutors, governors, or presidents. The second places the 
responsibility with judges or juries. 
 
1. Popular Justice  
 
 The first version of OAF holds that courts should convict government agents who 
engage in coercive interrogation, but if the coercive interrogation was morally justified, 
then the defendant should be pardoned, or perhaps not tried in the first place via the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. One might even imagine the public taking matters in 
its own hands and hiding or protecting the defendant,63 or electing him or her to office, or 
reelecting the defendant if he or she is already an elected official.64 
 
 The peculiar feature of this argument is the assumption that public officials will 
act correctly if they are told that correct action is against the law. Why wouldn’t they just 
say to themselves, as they must every day: “I could get the truth out of this suspect by 
banging him up but for whatever reason I’m not allowed to do this, so I won’t”?  The 
implicit assumption is that the public official will act correctly when enough lives are at 
stake,65 but why should we assume that a police officer would be willing to risk his career 
and his freedom to save the lives of others?  Of course, there are many heroes who would 
do this, but we don’t normally, when designing legal restrictions on the activities of 
government agents, base the law on the assumption that agents will act heroically. 
 
 Let us try to think about this problem from the perspective of a police officer who 
has custody of a member of Al Qaeda, a person who, the officer suspects, knows about 
plans for a major terrorist attack. Under OAF, the officer should anticipate that if he uses 
coercive interrogation, he will be convicted of a crime, but there is a chance that the 
public will forgive him, and that he will be pardoned or not charged in the first place or 
acquitted by a jury. But how will he know if the public will forgive him?  The public 
might be grateful, but it might also be outraged. The public might make the correct moral 
calculus or it might make the wrong moral calculus. 
                                                 
62 Ackerman’s proposal to give the president temporary dictatorial powers during an emergency has this 
flavor, though he does not mention coercive interrogation. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029 (2004). 
63 Cf., Robert Cover, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1984)(describing protection of fugitive slaves in the north). 
64 Lincoln’s reelection can be interpreted as vindication of his various extraconstitutional acts. This idea  of 
emergency prerogative can be traced back to Locke; see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY  60-64 (2004). Our focus, however, is not on the president (for whom the OAF approach may 
have a stronger basis), but on ordinary government agents. 
65 See Gross, supra, at 1529-34. Gross argues that the danger that the public will not ratify the official’s 
illegal but justified use of coercive interrogation is a good thing, as it will ensure that the official will not 
act except in an emergency. He doesn’t acknowledge that the same danger may ensure that the official will 
not act even in an emergency. Given his premise that the use of coercive interrogation in an emergency can 
be justified, we don’t find his argument persuasive. 
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In general, there is no reason to think that OAF will produce optimal deterrence.  
Ex post politics will sometimes forgive interrogation when it shouldn’t be forgiven, and 
sometimes punish interrogation when it shouldn’t be punished.  If an OAF regime does 
happen to produce optimal deterrence, it will be but a lucky coincidence, for there is no 
general mechanism that acts to align the incentives produced by OAF with optimal 
incentives.  Moreover, even if the happy coincidence does occur, the optimal OAF 
regime is unlikely to prove stable for very long, as we discuss below. 
 
The argument against OAF is identical to the argument in favor of the rule of law, 
an argument that appears to be decisive in every other setting, including the regulation of 
ordinary police practices such as the use of deadly force. Although prosecutorial 
discretion, jury nullification, and the pardon power are important features of 
contemporary law enforcement, these phenomena are generally accepted as either 
unavoidable (in the case of prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification) or safety valves 
for correcting injustices that occur in anomalous cases, not as the chief tool for ensuring 
that people are given the right incentives against a background where desirable behavior 
is, for whatever reason, illegal. We need not rehash all the rule of law arguments against 
such a system. It is sufficient to recall that there are good reasons of fairness and 
incentives to tell government agents in advance what they should do, and what they 
shouldn’t do. Regulating ex post through public opinion, even if mediated by political 
officials such as prosecutors or elected leaders, makes officers dependent on their 
abilities to prognosticate the public mood, which can sometimes seize on factors that are 
irrelevant to the decision in question. Excessive caution is the most likely result. 
 
OAF regimes can be found in other areas of criminal law.66 Laws that prohibit 
sodomy, fornication, adultery and euthanasia are frequently cited examples of laws that 
are on the books but that are not enforced or (in the case of euthanasia) tacitly permitted 
under special circumstances. But none of these examples provide support for an OAF 
regime for coercive interrogation. 
 
Most of these OAF regimes – for example, sodomy and adultery laws – arose 
inadvertently, not as a result of deliberate policy. The regime is an unintended or 
accidental byproduct of changes in norms or behavior, changes that temporarily outrun 
changes in law; and the OAF regime is precarious and often collapses in relatively short 
order, as the contradiction between official rule and actual practice becomes ever-more-
widely understood. Indeed, “forgiveness” in these cases is automatic; people are almost 
never convicted for these crimes; and no one would claim that laws against sodomy cause 
people to engage in sodomy only in the limited (?) conditions when it is morally justified 
and not otherwise! Experience with these laws suggest an OAF regime for coercive 
interrogation would likely be infeasible, because unstable in the medium and long term, 
as it becomes widely understood that officials are awarding ex post licenses to 
interrogators. 
 
                                                 
66 They have a family resemblance to the notion of acoustic separation; see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision 
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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The best example of an OAF regime that may seem functional is that of 
euthanasia. Many people acknowledge that mercy killing may be morally justified in 
narrow conditions, but prefer to maintain an absolute ban on euthanasia, with the tacit 
understanding that doctors may be spared prosecution and punishment if circumstances 
are pressing enough. But, as a result, the practice of euthanasia is shrouded in secrecy; we 
know very little about euthanasia in the United States; perhaps, doctors practice 
euthanasia at the right times, but perhaps they do not. When abortion OAF regimes 
existed prior to Roe v. Wade, wealthier women could sometimes rely on their doctors, 
while poorer women resorted to back alley abortions. Perhaps, today doctors provide 
euthanasia to those who can afford high quality health care, and others provide back alley 
euthanasia to those who cannot. 
 
Recent accounts from the Netherlands paint an unattractive picture of OAF. 
There, consensual euthanasia is legal, but infant euthanasia is illegal and yet nonetheless 
practiced. “Behind the scenes paediatricians in the Netherlands have been making tacit 
deals with local prosecutors’ offices for years, promising to report cases of ‘life-ending 
treatment for newborns’ in return for guarantees that the doctors will not find themselves 
hauled into the dock facing charges of murder.”67 Secrecy and lack of public 
accountability are the result. Doctors have recently demanded that the government issue 
regulations; despite the tacit deals, doctors fear criminal liability and are reluctant to 
continue the practice of infant euthanasia without an explicit legal license.68  The Dutch 
OAF regime for euthanasia, then, does not seem to provide good incentives, prevents 
public debate and accountability, and is unstable. 
 
The euthanasia OAF regimes, here and elsewhere, arose spontaneously, as a result 
of civil disobedience by doctors. No one proposed that these regimes be put in place. 
Accordingly, it is distinctive, and distinctly odd, to propose that coercive interrogation 
should intentionally and avowedly be regulated by means of an OAF regime. The public 
statement of the proposal – after all, proponents of an OAF regime publish their writings 
– gives it a self-defeating character, undermining the proposal itself. OAF regimes may 
often represent “states that are essentially byproducts,”69 which can happen to come into 
being as the byproduct of changes in norms outpacing changes in law, but which cannot 
be deliberately brought into being through intentional and publicly avowed policy choice. 
The publicity of the debate is crucial here. It is perfectly coherent for a group of legal 
elites secretly to approve of the twin facts that coercive interrogation is used and that the 
public does not generally understand that it is used; but presumably that is not the sort of 
thing the OAF proponents mean to be defending.   
 
2. The Necessity Defense 
 
 Israeli law bans coercive interrogation, and yet Israeli security has used this 
measure, apparently because officials who use coercive interrogation may be shielded by 
                                                 
67 See Ian Traynor, Secret Killings of Newborn Babies Trap Dutch Doctors in Moral Maze, THE GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 21, 2004, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1377808,00.html. 
68 Id. 
69  See Jon Elster, SOUR GRAPES (1983). 
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the necessity defense (as well as prosecutorial discretion that is predisposed in their 
favor).70  Under the necessity defense, which exists in American law as well, an act that 
would otherwise be a serious crime – killing, torture – does not give rise to legal liability 
if it was necessary to prevent a greater harm. Now, in American law the necessity defense 
would not typically be available to an official who engaged in coercive interrogation 
because the necessary act must usually prevent an imminent threat.71 Shooting an armed 
suspect in order to prevent him from killing a hostage is justified;72 using physical 
pressure on the suspect in order to extract the location of a hostage who is about to be 
killed is not justified. But in Israel, the necessity defense is, in practice, given greater 
scope.73 
 
 Critics of coercive interrogation who nonetheless believe it should be used in 
catastrophic scenarios sometimes see the necessity defense as a good compromise.74  
Coercive interrogation remains illegal, but the necessity defense can be used – either in 
its present form, or broadened somewhat – in order to immunize the official who uses 
coercive interrogation to prevent a catastrophe. The rationale appears to be that the law’s 
symbolic rejection of torture is maintained, while coercive interrogation can be used 
when it is justified. A closely related view is that judges should suspend the sentence of 
convicted torturers whose behavior does not meet the requirements of the necessity 
defense but was nonetheless justified.75 
 
 We are puzzled by this argument. As Levinson remarks, reliance on the necessity 
defense would not avoid legitimizing coercive interrogation;76 it would avoid legitimating 
coercive interrogation only when it is not “necessary.”  The necessity defense is no more 
likely to maintain the illegitimacy of coercive interrogation than the doctrine of official 
immunity maintains the illegitimacy of the use of deadly force by police officers. The 
defense of necessity, like the defense of official immunity, renders legitimate those 
actions that fall within its scope. 
 
The implicit theory of the advocates of the necessity defense is that a statute that 
creates liability sends the message to the public, while the statute that provides a defense 
against liability remains silent. But as the public does not usually pay attention to the law 
on the books – and when it does, never discriminates between statutes that create liability 
and statutes that provide defenses – but instead observes police officers either being 
convicted of crimes or not being convicted of crimes, this theory is dubious.  If the public 
                                                 
70 Landau Report, supra, at 167. 
71 See Wayne R. Lafave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §10.1(d)  at 129-131(2003) (saying one must wait 
until there is absolutely no other option and “the hope of survival disappears”). 
72 See LaFave, supra, §10.5 at 161. 
73 Although the Israeli Supreme Court denied that the necessity defense authorizes coercive interrogation, 
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supra. 
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is paying no attention to legal rules, and only looks at outcomes, it will just see 
interrogators going unpunished in a range of cases.  If the public does pay attention to 
legal rules, why will it only pay attention to the ex ante prohibition and not the ex post 
license?  OAF rests on arbitrary assumptions about the audience for law’s expressions. 
 
 There is a further point, which is that if it really matters whether the power to use 
coercive interrogation is located in the statute that creates liability, or in the defense, this 
can be easily handled, indeed already is. When a police officer kills a person, and a 
prosecutor charges him with murder, the officer’s defense will be official immunity. 
Whether or not the police officer is convicted turns on the scope of the defense. If the 
killing was justified under the statute or doctrine that creates official immunity, then it 
was not murder. Coercive interrogation could be similarly handled, if these formal 
distinctions were thought to be important.77 
 
B. The Torture Warrant 
 
 Alan Dershowitz has argued that coercive interrogation should be permitted only 
after officials have obtained a warrant from a judge.78  This proposal has been criticized 
on the ground that in the catastrophic scenario there will rarely be an opportunity to 
consult a judge;79 but this criticism is overdrawn. The torture warrant is not meant as a 
panacea; when there is time to obtain a warrant, the involvement of the judiciary serves 
its purpose. When there is not time, then either the warrant requirement could be waived 
– as in the case for ordinary search and arrest warrants when exigent circumstances exist 
– or else coercive interrogation might be prohibited. In the latter case, the torture warrant 
serves its purpose only when there are not time constraints but there is no reason to think 
that this is the null set. 
 
 We don’t think, however, that the torture warrant is the end of the story. Just as in 
the case of searches, a warrant requirement can be only one piece of a much larger 
regulatory structure, to which we now turn. 
 
C. A Proposal for Regulating Coercive Interrogation 
 
 In order to deter and investigate crimes, police employ a range of measures, 
including: surveillance of public places; stops, interrogations, and pat-downs of people 
who are acting suspiciously; temporary detention; noncoercive interrogation that may, 
however, involve deception and mild intimidation; the use of force, including deadly 
force, to protect the lives of third parties such as hostages and crime victims; searches of 
people and places; and wiretapping and the like. The measures range from the minimally 
intrusive (surveillance of public places) to the maximally intrusive (use of deadly force), 
                                                 
77 This approach would allow the legislature to decide the standard for using coercive interrogation, rather 
than relying on a doctrine that was never understood to have this purpose (at least, in American law), and 
would need to be revised. See Alan Dershowitz, Is It Necessary to Apply “Physical Pressure” to Terrorists 
– And to Lie About It?, 23 ISRAELI L. REV. 192 (1989) (discussing problems with using the necessity 
defense in these circumstances); Kremnitzer, supra, at 237-47. 
78 Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra, at 158-59. 
79 Gross, supra, at 1536. 
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and there are corresponding thresholds that limit the circumstances under which these 
measures may be employed. There is virtually no limit on surveillance of public places; 
reasonable suspicion is required before police can stop and question a person; probable 
cause is needed before a search warrant will be issued; and the threat of imminent harm 
to a third party is necessary if deadly force is to be used. 
 
 What happens when police violate these rules?  In some cases, nothing at all. In 
other cases, courts refuse to admit evidence that is acquired in violation of the rules, and a 
criminal may go free. In extreme cases, police officers may be sanctioned, fired, or 
convicted of crimes. For example, a police officer who kills a suspect who did not pose 
any immediate danger to the public is likely to be penalized and even fired; if the 
circumstances are egregious, the officer will be prosecuted for murder. 
 
 The reasons for this regulatory scheme are straightforward. Police officers are 
agents, and as principal-agent models show, a bundle of carrots and sticks is necessary to 
provide them with the right motivations.80  Ideally, police officers will use intrusive 
measures only when the gains to the public safety exceed the costs to the people who are 
subject to the measures (whether they are innocents who are misidentified or criminals). 
However, police officers, like ordinary people, do not necessarily have the right 
incentives to use these measures properly. 
 
 The basic problem is this. If police officers are paid a flat salary, and not 
rewarded for good work, then they may not work diligently to deter crime and capture 
suspects. The normal solution to this problem is to fire or demote lazy officers, and 
reward the diligent officers – usually by retaining (and paying) them, and promoting them 
at intervals, and giving them better working conditions (for example, day rather than 
night shifts). The problem with this simple scheme, however, is that police officers might 
act too aggressively. If they are rewarded for arresting a lot of people, then they may be 
tempted to arrest people who are not clearly guilty, or to use aggressive measures such as 
searches to find the guilty. In addition, zeal for law enforcement or sympathy for victims 
may result in excessively aggressive police tactics even in the absence of the normal 
reward mechanisms. 
 
 And so police departments and legislatures try to steer police away from tactics 
that externalize costs on innocents, or offend our sense of how the guilty ought to be 
treated. This is why we have rules that prohibit police from shooting people who are 
unarmed, or engaging in high speed chases through busy streets, or searching houses 
without a warrant. These rules refine incentives so that police officers aggressively 
pursue criminals without creating excessive costs for innocents or otherwise exceeding 
the bounds of civilized behavior. 
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 Where does coercive interrogation fit in?  Traditionally,81 it was off limits in the 
same sense as shooting unarmed criminals is; even if a useful police tactic in some cases, 
it exceeds the bounds of civilized behavior and thus is unacceptable. If philosophers are 
correct that coercive interrogation may be justified in limited cases, however, and if 9/11 
shows that this set of cases may be nontrivial, then coercive interrogation ought to be 
added to the basket of permissible tactics, albeit subject to the same sorts of safeguards. 
 
 As we have already argued, we think that the regulation of the use of deadly force 
provides a model for regulating coercive interrogation. Just how coercive interrogation 
should be regulated depends on several factors. To take the extreme case, if coercive 
interrogation simply does not work or rarely works, then obviously it is sensible to ban it 
with no exceptions. In what follows, we sketch out a general framework that assumes that 
coercive interrogation is effective; but the details of this framework will depend on just 
how effective it is, and whether its effectiveness is limited to certain situations. 
 
 1. Thresholds for using coercive interrogation. It seems sensible to limit coercive 
interrogation in the same way deadly force is limited. The rule might be: “police may use 
coercive interrogation only when they are reasonably certain that an individual possesses 
information that could prevent an imminent crime that will kill at least n people,” where n 
is some number that reflects the balance of gains and losses from coercive interrogation 
(1000?  100?  1?).82  For the consequentialist, n may be a relatively low number; for the 
deontologist, n might be very high, the catastrophic scenario; but otherwise, both types of 
thinker should approve of our rule. 
 
 2. Limits of coercive interrogation: methods. Just as police are not allowed to 
carry bazookas, they should not be allowed to use methods of coercive interrogation that 
are excessive – that will cause too much harm relative to the benefits. The literature refers 
                                                 
81 That is, since the Supreme Court invalidated these measures just prior to World War II. See Parry & 
White, supra, at 748-54. 
82 Or a vaguer standard might be used, such as that of the Model Penal Code, §3.07: 
 
(1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effect an Arrest. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of 
Section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is 
making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately 
necessary to effect a lawful arrest. 
… 
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: 
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and 
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person 
whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and 
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent 
persons; and 
(iv) the actor believes that: 
(A) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of 
deadly force; or 
(B) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury 
if his apprehension is delayed. 
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to “moderate” methods.83  We do not know what methods these are; perhaps a good 
starting point would be the methods already used by U.S. agents against high level 
members of Al Qaeda – sleep deprivation, disorientation, and the like.84  In any event, a 
good rule would limit agents to the minimal amount of coercion that is necessary. 
Interrogation might also be videotaped, for review either by administrative superiors or 
later judicial tribunals or both. 
 
 3. Limits of coercive interrogation: subjects. It seems reasonable to limit the use 
of coercive interrogation to members of terrorist groups known to use violent methods 
against American civilians. The obvious example today is Al Qaeda, but Al Qaeda might 
disappear and be replaced with some other group. The benefit of such a limit is that it 
would prevent the use of coercive interrogation against ordinary criminals; the cost is that 
the limit would prevent the use of coercive interrogation against ordinary criminals where 
coercive interrogation would be justified (for example, domestic terrorists), and against 
members of new international terrorist groups, and against members of Al Qaeda who are 
not known to be members of Al Qaeda. It might be that these costs are too high, and the 
subject limitations should be broader – to include, for example, kidnappers with a violent 
history who have been captured and refuse to disclose the location of the kidnapping 
victim.85 
 
 4. Warrants. Dershowitz’s warrant idea makes sense when the harm is not 
imminent, so that there is time to involve a magistrate or judge. The magistrate or judge 
should issue a warrant only when coercive interrogation will likely yield information that 
will prevent a crime that will kills n people. 
 
 5. Immunities and punishments. Officers who employ coercive interrogation 
measures in violation of these rules should be punished in the same way that officers who 
violate the rules against deadly force are punished. Typically, officers are granted 
immunity when they act reasonably, or in “objective good faith”;86 and this may be 
appropriate for coercive interrogation as well. Even so, administrative sanctions may be 
appropriate. When officers do not act reasonably, the immunity should be withdrawn, and 
the officer should be punished for violating laws against battery, torture, and similar uses 
of force. 
 
 6. Training and expertise. Nearly all police officers are authorized to use deadly 
force. An important way of preventing error is through training. Similarly, one might 
argue that police officers should be trained in coercive interrogation. Alternatively, to the 
extent that coercive interrogation requires unusual skills, or may corrupt its practitioners 
or lead them to use it in routine cases, and to the extent that it is not necessary to use it 
                                                 
83 U.N. Report, supra, at 2 (referring to the type of pressure used to obtain information from terrorists as 
being moderate) 
84 See Levinson’s survey of media accounts; Levinson, supra, at 2017-28. 
85 See Amnesty International, Germany’s Torturous Debate, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/April2003/Germany (describing an incident in which a kidnapper 
disclosed the location of the victim (a child, whom he had killed) after a police officer threatened to use 
force against him). 
86  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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very often, it might make sense to have a special squad of officers who are trained in 
coercive interrogation, and who are made available when circumstances warrant.87  
However, this can work only when there are minimal time constraints; otherwise, it is 
subject to the same objections as the warrant requirement. 
 
 7. Public and judicial review. One important distinction between deadly force and 
coercive interrogation is that the first occurs frequently, and each instance is subject to 
public debate. The latter occurs much less frequently, and when it does, it is either 
concealed from the public or roundly condemned. As a result, the merits and demerits of 
coercive interrogation are much more poorly understood than the merits and demerits of 
deadly force. To correct this imbalance, we think that instances of coercive interrogation 
should always be carefully analyzed, whether by special commissions of experts, judicial 
panels, or self-appointed public watchdogs. 
 
 This seems obvious, but we mention it because many people in the literature think 
that the symbolism is a good reason for banning coercive interrogation, or discouraging 
it; and this idea seems to drive the proposal that it should be kept illegal for symbolic 
purposes even though officials will sometimes be morally justified in violating the law.88  
As we discussed above, we don’t think this argument makes much sense; a further 
problem with it is that it will encourage officers to conceal their behavior. After the 
Israeli Supreme Court rejected the use of coercive interrogation, the GSS officially 
stopped using it. It is possible that now the GSS has found less objectionable ways to 
maintain security, but some reports suggest that the use of coercive interrogation has 
continued with greater secrecy.89  If so, then the methods may be used with less political 
oversight and accountability. This would be unfortunate. 
 
What is needed is legality and openness.90 Explicit rules, which clearly prohibit 
some forms of pressure and permit others, can be easily evaluated; if outcomes are not 
acceptable, the rules can be adjusted. 
 
D. The Burden of Uncertainty 
 
                                                 
87  The Investigators Unit, the GSS unit that uses coercive interrogation, is a small minority of the total GSS 
personal. See Landau Report, supra, at 148.  
88 Gross, supra, at 1486-87, 1504-5. 
89 See Human Rights Watch, Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority 
Territories, in World Report 2003, available at: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast5.html (“On September 
4, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel reported that there appeared to be a ‘gradual reversion to 
the use of torture’ despite the September 1999 High Court decision outlawing its use. While the extent of 
their use was unclear, methods outlawed by the High Court but reportedly used during interrogation 
included exposure to extremes of temperature, sleep deprivation, the requirement to remain in an enforced 
position for extended periods, and intense psychological pressure.”)  The report mentioned above can be 
found at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/publications.asp?menu=5&submenu=1.  
90  See Alan Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility and Accountability is Worse Than With It, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONSTL. L. 326 (2003); cf. Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture of 
Suspected Terrorists, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (1997) (arguing that a nominal ban 
on coercive interrogation could have perverse effects by driving interrogation underground). 
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 A proposal for law reform of this kind can rarely be demonstrated to be correct. It 
remains possible for someone whose empirical estimates differ from ours to claim that 
coercive interrogation should be flatly prohibited, on rule-consequentialist grounds. Such 
a person might claim that there are raw empirical differences between coercive 
interrogation and other coercive practices that law addresses through ordinary ex ante 
regulation (as opposed to either strict prohibition or the scheme of ex post pardons, 
nullification and the like). Perhaps, for example, extrajudicial killing is very often 
necessary, as a factual matter, while coercive interrogation is rarely so, again as a factual 
matter. Note also, however, that legal policy should take account of the expected costs 
and benefits of official action, which is a function not only of the frequency of relevant 
events but also of their costs and benefits when they do happen to occur. The expected 
benefits of coercive interrogation might be equal to or greater than those of extrajudicial 
killing, if coercive interrogation, while rarely useful, saves many more lives when it is 
useful. 
 
Given the factual uncertainties, it is incumbent upon those who oppose coercive 
interrogation to explain why the right regime is either of the alternatives: a flat ban on 
coercive interrogation, which we have criticized as an implausible corner solution, or the 
OAF regime of “prohibition” plus ex post relief, which we have criticized as both 
undesirable and unstable. Even if one believes that coercive interrogation is rarely 
warranted, the most sensible approach, within the framework of our proposal, would 
simply be to tighten the relevant standards to the point where the benefits of licensing 
coercive interrogation exceed the costs. Coercive interrogation could be limited to known 
members of designated terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, or limited to cases in which 
more than 10 lives will certainly be saved if the information is extracted; penalties for 
officials who violate the rules in unreasonable or bad-faith ways, and who are thus 
stripped of immunity, could be made more severe. 
 
In the face of empirical uncertainty, that is, the simplest starting point is to assume 
that law should regulate coercive interrogation within the same type of framework law 
uses to regulate similar activities. There might indeed be a difference between coercive 
interrogation and other coercive practices, but there is no a priori reason to assume so, 
absent proof. Opponents of legalization – in our ordinary sense of legalization, as 
opposed to the self-undermining OAF sense – bear the burden of showing that coercive 
interrogation should be treated differently; and they have not carried that burden. 
  
IV. Why Is Coercive Interrogation Taboo? 
 
 We have emphasized throughout that coercive interrogation can inflict serious 
harms; that officials are commonly licensed, in ordinary legal systems, to inflict serious 
harms under suitable regulation; and that there is no good reason to treat coercive 
interrogation differently. Our argument has been strictly normative, because it is quite 
clear that coercive interrogation is indeed treated differently than other serious harms, as 
a matter of prevailing positive law. Why is this so?  Here we offer some brief 
speculations about why coercive interrogation is taboo. 
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A. Mistaken generalization 
 
The simplest idea is that the taboo on coercive interrogation is just a conceptual 
blunder, a kind of mistaken generalization from the moral condemnation of other 
practices that modern legal systems justifiably condemn.91  One sort of faulty 
generalization might occur across subcategories of “torture.”  The actual practices of 
coercive interrogation bear a family resemblance to forms of torture that are used to 
intimidate, terrorize or oppress. The failure to draw relevant moral, legal and policy 
distinctions between these different practices produces a legal regime that condemns 
coercive interrogation along with practices that have no conceivable justification. 
 
Another sort of faulty generalization might reflect the emotional force of highly 
salient historical episodes. The Spanish Inquisition used torture in the service of religious 
oppression; Nazi doctors used torture in the service of racist ideology. The inference from 
“these episodes of torture are unjustifiable” to “torture is unjustifiable” is natural, but 
invalid. Pacifism cannot be derived from the premise that some wars have been unjust; no 
more can a general ban on torture in the sense of coercive interrogation be derived from 
the historical use of torture in the sense of sadistic punishment. 
 
B. Moral heuristics 
 
By itself, the idea of mistaken generalization is unsatisfactory. Why exactly do 
such conceptual errors occur?  A possible mechanism here involves moral heuristics.92  In 
evaluating questions of fact, boundedly rational individuals acting with limited 
information and cognitive capacities use heuristics, or rules of thumb, that sometimes 
misfire. By extension, boundedly rational individuals often use heuristics to make moral 
judgments, and those judgments will sometimes misfire as well. Consider, as one 
possible moral heuristic, the principle advanced by Henry Shue and discussed in Part I: 
never inflict pain on a defenseless person. In the run of cases, in which pain is inflicted 
for sadistic or oppressive purposes, the heuristic works well. In an identifiable subclass of 
cases, however, where inflicting pain on the defenseless through coercive interrogation 
saves real lives, the heuristic produces moral results that very few wish to defend.93 
Here the parallelism with evaluation of fact breaks down; even in this subclass of 
cases, Shue’s principle is not demonstrably wrong in the same way that an error of fact is 
demonstrably wrong. To say the least, however, the moral arguments that would be 
needed to justify Shue’s principle in that subclass of cases are far more complex, and less 
impressive, than in the run of cases covered by the heuristic. Even if the heuristic 
happens to produce morally defensible outcomes across the whole range of cases – and 
                                                 
91  On morality, consequentialism and mistaken generalization, see Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist 
Decisions, 17 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 1 (1994). 
92  See Baron, supra; Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 
(2004) 
93  This seems to be similar to Mark Osiel’s view that torture is taboo because people don’t want to 
acknowledge that such horrifying behavior may be socially justified under certain conditions, and that 
“normal” people are fully capable of it. See Mark Osiel, MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL, AND HANNAH 
ARENDT 155-60 (2001). He does not, however, explain why this should be the case. 
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we saw in Part I that even Shue flinches from the implications of his principle when lives 
can be saved by coercive interrogation – it produces those outcomes fortuitously, on 
morally unsatisfactory grounds. In this sense, the heuristic can be said to misfire even if 
we bracket large and controversial questions about morality. 
 
C. Judgment Falsification, Cascades and Herding 
 
People often say, in sweeping terms, that torture (and by subsumption coercive 
interrogation) is in some general sense “evil” or “wrong.”  People want to be well thought 
of by others, want to be seen to stand on the right side of charged moral questions, and 
tend to follow the moral judgments of others if they are themselves unsure what morality 
requires. Perhaps these phenomena are linked. More specifically, we speculate that (1) of 
those who have thought about the range of possible cases, more people actually approve 
of coercive interrogation (in some cases) than publicly admit they approve of coercive 
interrogation; (2) many people have not really thought about the issues at all, and simply 
follow prevailing moral codes. 
The first possibility is an instance of judgment falsification.94  The concern for 
reputation, social influences, and the fear of ostracism produce dynamics that drive a 
wedge between publicly expressed judgments and privately held judgments. To openly 
condone coercive interrogation is to condone a form of torture, and no one wants to 
condone that. In private, however, many of the same people may believe that coercive 
interrogation should be permitted in some circumstances. Our point is not that privately 
held moral views are authentic while publicly expressed ones are not, nor that privately 
held views are more likely than public ones to track what morality indeed requires. But to 
the extent law tends to reflect publicly expressed judgments more than privately held 
views, law may condemn torture more strongly, and in more sweeping terms, than do the 
private judgments of citizens. 
The second possibility is an instance of herding, or of opinion cascades.95  On 
issues of fact or morality, where people do not know what to think, lack the time or 
inclination to think for themselves, or know that others may have insights they lack, 
people may quite reasonably decide to follow the judgments of others. Those others may 
in turn be following the judgments of others, and so on. Under certain conditions, almost 
everyone may subscribe to a given moral view that almost nobody has thought through, 
or would hold on fuller reflection. Coercive interrogation follows this pattern, it seems to 
us. People’s initial judgments about the impermissibility of coercive interrogation, as a 
matter of morality and law, are sharp and strongly avowed, but tend to become far 
weaker and more nuanced after discussion and reflection. The sweeping condemnation of 
coercive interrogation embodied in current law looks like an artifact of past opinion 
cascades, and might dissolve rather easily under changed circumstances or upon further 
debate. 
Taboos come and go; none is eternal. A strong taboo once condemned abortion, 
which no one cared openly to defend; today there are rapidly waning taboos against 
                                                 
94  By extension from preference falsification. See Timur Kuran, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995). 
95 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 81 (2000). 
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euthanasia, and against gay marriage. Bracketing the question which of these practices is 
morally permissible, the constant flux of social taboos rebuts a common presumption that 
there must be some deep moral logic to taboos, such as the one condemning all forms of 
coercive interrogation. Perhaps there is sometimes or often no such logic; perhaps taboos 
often rest on fortuitous constellations of historical circumstances that can be destabilized 
by new circumstances, or even by reasoned argument. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Our aim is not to praise coercive interrogation, which is a grave evil on any 
reasonable moral view. All we suggest is that law should treat coercive interrogation the 
way it treats other grave evils. Law has a typical or baseline regulatory strategy for 
coping with grave evils that sometimes produce greater goods. That strategy involves a 
complex regulatory regime of rules-with-exceptions, involving a prohibition on official 
infliction of serious harms, permission to inflict such harms in tightly cabined 
circumstances, and an immunity regime that requires officials to follow the rules in good 
faith but protects them if they do so. In this baseline regime, the circumstances in which 
serious harms may be inflicted are specified ex ante, rather than being remitted solely to 
the discretionary mercy of juries, judges and the executive after the fact. Contrary to the 
academic consensus, we see no plausible reason for treating coercive interrogation 
differently.  
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